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DUDLEY CRAWFORD SHARP-SECRETARY FOR AIR*
ROBERT C. COTNER and PEYTON E. COOK

The Eugene C. Barker Texas History Center at the University of
Texas was the place of my first meeting with Dudley C. Sharp. Although
a very busy man, with manufacturing interests in Houston, he had come
to Austin with his mother, Mrs. Walter B. Sharp, to discuss the progress
being made with the Pioneers of Texas Oil Project. As many of you know,
the University has about 150 tape recordings, collected over the past ten
years by Mody Boatright, William Owens, Winnie Allen and others, dealing
with the pioneers in the oil business in Texas. The Sharps have been
keenly interested in this program and have contributed most of the money
made available for obtaining the recordings. Recall that Walter B. Sharp
was an early water well drilling contractor, turned oil man. While studying the oil developments at Spindletop, I learned that he was a business
associate of ex-Governor James S. Hogg. You may recall that Sharp died
from heat exhaustion after fighting an oil fire in 1911. Mrs. Sharp was
widowed with several small children. Dudley, born in 1905, was about six
when his father died'!

..

As I talked with Dudley Sharp in Austin I could see the resemblance
to his father. Both were handsome men, over six feet tall, rangy rather
than stout, with alert eyes and friendly countenance. Dudley had evidenced early a keen interest in things practical and theoretical. His
mother with business acumen and by careful investment was able to travel
and the varying experiences heightened the imaginations of her sons.
Because of his religious and philosophical insights, Mrs. Sharp considered
for a while sending Dudley to the Orient to absorb its ancient learning.
However, he enrolled at Princeton in the early 1920's, taking five years to
graduate because he spent one year in Europe. Later he and some other
college youths went big game hunting in Malaysia and narrowly escaped
death from jungle fever. When he traveled up the China coast the Chinese crew mutinied when the boat nearly sank in a typhoon. Dudley
worked to save the ship and passengers. 2 I have stressed these events to
show that he was not unaware of the distant parts of the world when he
was called to public service by the Eisenhower Administration.
Mr. Sharp continued his interest in the sea and owned a yacht which
he turned over to the Navy in 1942. At this time he was co-owner with
his brother and mother of the Mission Manufacturing Company in Houston, continuing a pattern started by his father who was once a partner
with Howard Hughes in the Sharp-Hughes Tool Co., primarily interested
in oil drilling machinery. When Dudley volunteered for duty with the
Navy he served two years as Executive Officer and later Commanding Officer of submarine chasers and destroyer escort vessels. Recognizing his special knowledge of business, he was assigned to the Office of Procurement
*This paper was delivered by Dr. Cotner of the University of Texas at
the East Texas Historical Association meeting in Huntsville.
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and Material. He also served for six months "as administrative manager
of the Applied Physics Laboratory"3 at Silver Spring, Maryland, which
was engaged in important research and development work for the Navy,
Following the truce in Korea, the Eisenhower Administration began to
reorganize the. various branches of the armed services and to seek ways
to economize, hoping to obtain a balanced budget. In 1955 Dudley Sharp
was called in as a civilian adviser to General Edwin M. Rawlins, Commander of the Air Force Materiel Command, at Wright-Patterson Air
Force Base in Ohio. His special duty related to the machine tool stockpiling program. It was apparent that Mr. Sharp was experienced in the
field of manufacturing, had military experience both as a unit commander
and as a staff officer, and he was learning the special problems of the Air
Force. Apparently, he was making good for on July 12, 1955 the New
York Times announced that "Dudley C. Sharp, a Houston manufacturer
of oil field supplies, was said to be slated to succeed Roger Lewis as Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for procurement."4 Confirmation of
Secretary Lewis's pending resignation effective September 20, 1955, was
soon announced and Sharp's nomination was public knowledge.
People, in and out of Congress, now wanted to know more about Mr.
Sharp and why he had been selected. Eisenhower, if not the Republican
party, had carried Texas in 1952. One reason for the growing strength of
the party in Houston was the fact that a man like Sharp had served as
finance chairman of the Harris County Republicans since 1952. He would
also represent the spirit of unification in the defense department since he
had experience in materiel with the Navy. Furthermore, he ought to know
what manufacturing costs were and was prepared to give contracts a close
look with a view to effective, quality procurement and to economy. He
could be of service to the Eisenhower administration and to the country.
His sense of public duty was best stated by himself:

..

I feel that it is a duty of people in business, if we intend to
preserve our system under which I prospered, and many others
of us prosper, to offer our services whenever they are available,
whenever they are asked for, and whenever we feel that we can do
a fair job and are qualified to the job. s
He also felt that people who failed to accept public responsibility when
asked to contribute their skills, even with some loss of income, should not
complain about how government was run.
The Houston Post sent Sharp off to the tests of confirmation with the
following:
Mr. Sharp, a man of many and wide interests, will take with him
to Washington the good wishes of all Houstonians. His will be
a big and complicated job, but in his years here he has demonstrated that he is well equip~ed to handle it. 6
But the hazard course to confirmation was to be a rugged one. He arrived in Washington when the business interests of Harold E. Talbott,
Secretary of the Air Force, were much in the news. The Senate Armed
Services Committee was sensitive over the criticisms and proceeded to go
thoroughly into Mr. Sharp's business· interests and probed for any signs

.
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of conflict of interest, which is considered to exist if an official, such as
Mr. Talbott, owned stock or had any interest in an organization doing di~'ect business with the government. Even the chance of favoritism was
to be avoided. Even companies doing business indirectly with departments
of government came within the meaning of "Conflict of Interest." Mr.
Sharp understood his need to dispose of stocks in Gulf, Humble and Phillips oil companies, Libby-Owens-Ford Glass, etc. However, he expected
to continue his interests in Texas Fund, Inc. and Mission Manufacturing
(the father's company) which he felt "in no way, create a conflict of interest with my official duties."7 Senator Harry Byrd (D-Va.) concentrated
his questions on Texas Fund, which owned stock in companies, such as
the Texas Company, which did direct business with the Defense Department. While the Texas Company was the largest stock account of the
Texas Fund, it was only about 4% of the total holdings. Many people in
the Southwest had invested in Texas Fund because of Mr. Sharp and he
was reluctant to sell although it represented much less than 1/100th of
his total securities holdings. Even giving up offices would not suffice, and
after a conference with Senator Leveret Saltonstall (R-Mass.) he agreed
to sell "as proof of my sincerity."s Except for the "Talbott Affair" and
his desire to aid Eisenhower, he would probably have turned around and
returned to Houston. However, he would not give up holdings in the
family owned Mission Manufacturing.
Mr. Sharp promised that he would "take no part in the management of
the company while in the Air Force post." Talbott had transferred some
of the holdings to his children. Senators Byrd and Russell wanted to
know if he would sell "on the open market."9 He answered, "Yes." He
considered the cost financially very great, but he had been nominated by
the President and he decided to accept the confirmation and go to work.
In 1962 he still felt that "the Senate Armed Services Committee was a
little unreasonable with me, maybe because they thought it was the
thing to do at the moment."lO The Committee had approved the nomination on July 30, 1955 and the Senate confirmed two days later.
On October 3, 1955 Dudley Sharp was sworn in as Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force (Materiel). His duties were largely in the area of
procurement of equipment and supplies-aircraft to nuts and bolts. He
was responsible for storage and handling of supplies, transportation and
communications for the Air Force, contracting, and for matters relating
to civil aviation. The Assistant Secretary made policy in areas of responsibility. He must work in close coordination with his immediate superior-the Under Secretary-as well as the Secretary for Air. In February, 1956, the Assistant Secretary was present at the appropriation
hearings and Congressman George Mahon wanted to know how a business
man had gone about learning his job. Sharp made this reply:
It is quite a task. For one thing, I think I have traveled a total
of about 50,000 miles in a very concentrated effort to call on the
contractors, on the air materiel area headquarters and on depots,
to see exactly how they go about pricing things, to find out first
hand from the people who actually do it and how it is done.

r made

a trip to Europe to investigate the MDAP [Mutual De-
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fense Assistance Pact] program . . . and to investigate our depots
over there.
In addition to that you have to burn the midnight oil quite a
lot. I spend a good many hours a day studying things I would
normally know if I had been here longer. I attend a great many
conferences. I am briefed a great deal on individual problems
as they come up and given the background.n

He also learned that it was seldom the "big things" which gave trouble,
but the many "little things."12
One of the mysteries of Washington is the budget. The defense part
was determined at a higher level than the Air Force (or Navy, as I found
out while in a personnel planning section). The Defense Department
then sliced the money in the proportions they felt were justified for each
service. The Air Force or other branch must then fit its next fiscal year
programs into its slice. The more stable costs, like pay and housing allowances, are not hard to determine but the allocation for other items
becomes most difficult. Take for example procurement projects running
over a period of years-missiles or bombers in blueprint. Furthermore, it
is difficult to start and stop big projects. Speed up or slow down called
for renegotiation of contracts; sometimes tooling or retooling. Instead
of the older method of buying items that looked good then and stockpiling
with possible early obsolescence, Sharp decided on a course of closer planning and of reducing of stockpiles. The Semi-annual Report of the Secretary of Defense to June 30, 1956 carried this announcement:
In November of 1955 the Air Force reoriented industrial mobilization planning to conform to changes in operational plans. In
the place of the traditional view of a prolonged industrial buildup
after a war begins, the Air Force substituted the concept of an
industrial structure ready for war at all times. 13
Sharp was thoroughly committed to the use of private industry, believing that "an efficient and progressive aircraft industry is the key to our
airpower."14 Once he told a group at a Lockheed plant that the Air Force
wished "to do everything in our power to keep the most efficient production
underway and at the greatest possible capacity consistent with the Air
Force overall program."15 The basic theory was that in case of a general
war, "American industry would deliver every possible piece of critical
equipment during the first 60 to 90 days. In the event of a local war,
there would be a rapid acceleration in production of critical weapons."16
Therefore, in 1956 Sharp worked to stabilize and strengthen the aircraft
industry. Stability was not enough-he demanded increased know-how.
On the other hand, the Government would continue to operate some very
special projects and even set up new facilities for experimentation, but old
plants would be used plioI' to new construction. For example, the missile
for THOR was being made at the Douglas plant in Santa Monica, California, but the engines were being tested at a new site at Santa Susana,
as no old facility was available for this work,17
In 1958 there were eighty government owned facilities.

Only five were

..
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idle. These last could be disposed of by the General Services Administration. Mr. Sharp also looked over available plants of other services to see
if the Air Force could use any. He noted that the Army and Navy had
several reserve plants and many expensive tools in storage. Part of this
was due to the Korean War. However, a complex accounting system had
worked against trading equipment between services. Money was involve~.
While one branch of the Armed Services was without money to buy, another Service might have a surplus of unused tools. It may seem strange
to learn that often, if they could buy from a sister service, the Air Force
might be charged more for tools than new ones could be bought for in open
market. Congress also was unhappy at the inter-sel'vice buying and selling
policies. Is
Sharp deserved much credit for helping to bring about changes. The
Army and Navy closed some installations and distributed the equipment.
Now by using the Consolidated Machine Tool Index, set up with the assistance of the Defense Department, one service was able to use idle equipment of another without having to pay for it. The Army had planned to
fight a war that might last five years, while the Air Force thought in
terms of months or even weeks. All recognized it was costly to maintain
large reserves and a partial compromise between the services was worked
out. The maximum reserve in any class of supplies was set at 30 months. 19
In 1956 Sharp obtained $69 millions for new industrial equipment under
a concept that the Air Force in order to achieve industrial readiness should
keep most of its owned tools in use. The Air Force should also let industry know what new tools would be needed, along with replacements. As
of June 30, 1956 there were 147,520 industrial items in the Air Force inventory 104,949 of which were in active use. At the same time in 1957 the
inventory was 148,163 but the number in use had increased to 115,323.
Then in 1958, with a new emphasis on missile production, the number of
machine tools in use decreased as did the inventory. Many tools were now
obsolete. On June 30, 1958 the inventory of industrial items was down to
101,843 while those in use had dropped to 74,135. 20

)

Other reforms initiated by the Assistant Secretary included tightening
upon contracts by offering incentives to keep down costs. Formal advertising for bids had been called for by the Armed Services Procurement
Act of 1947. However, in emergencies, like Korea, so-called "negotiated
contracts" were used sometimes. In March 1956, Sharp, in answer to
criticism of this practice, explained that the Air Force had enough "sound
statistics" that they could estimate costs for the "learning curve" period
while something new was being produced; the procedures were constantly
reviewed and yardsticks were modernized "to further adapt them to the
even more complicated weapons of the future."2! A study of air industry
profits extending back to 1942 was declared to be in line with other industrial profits. The Air Force had decided to use formal advertising for
almost every contract, but where complex weapons were being developed
of secret nature, it seemed wise that the Secretary retain the "negotiated
contract." For an example, use the B-52. No one really knew what it
would cost and sometimes only one or two companies were ready to proceed.

,

\
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In 1958 an improvement in formal advertising was made by the socalled "two-step" process. First, interested companies would submit technical data without prices for a contemplated product. Second, after the
evaluation of the data, those concerns which had submitted satisfactory
proposals were allowed to bid under normal procedures. The contract was
then awarded the lowest bidder. The purpose was to reduce the chance
of procuring an inferior product and to continue the use of formal advertising and bidding. 22
Mr. Sharp had authority over approval or disapproval of a contract.
He now pushed the "incentive" feature in contracts expecting thereby to
encourage contractors to reduce costs below their estimates in order to get
higher profits. To guard against too high profits, the Air Force established measurement criteria on costs of finished items. Based upon these
data, maximum profits were set. The Air Force wanted better equipment
2.t lower costs over the long run. However, Sharp recognized the incentive
clauses required new contracts to be renegotiated each year and while the
early incentive to reduce cost was substantial, it would fail to produce
results after a few years. 23
Mr. Sharp entered his duties at a time when the peacetime Air Force
reached its maximum strength of 137 wings. From this point until 1959,
when he resigned as Assistant Secretary, the size of the Air Force decreased. By 1959 the strength had decreased to 104 manned bomber wings
and one missile wing. The major emphasis shifted to quality rather than
quantity. Also the emphasis on types of weapon s}'stems was changing.
Missiles were assuming more importance in the retaliatory structure of the
Air Force, and the proportion of missiles to manned aircraft increased
during this period. It was also during this period that the last B-47
bomber was delivered to the Air Force. This occurred in February 1957.
The B-52 was to be the main manned bomber and it became operational
in 1956 and was being delivered at the rate of 15 per month. 24
In the Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense for the period July
1, 1958 to June 30, 1959, the Air Force stated that this was a period of
dramatic change. The Air Force said that missiles were assuming a much
more important role. Missiles would complement and replace current
weapons, and the trend would continue in the future. However, it was
felt that there would always be a need for manned weapon systems. This
was because the "judgment and reasoning ability of man have always been
required to assure complete accomplishment of the Air· Force mission regardless of the sophistication of the equipment. Man and his powers of
decision and his ability to reason will continue to be decisive in space."25
In this same report, signed by Mr. Sharp, the Air Force felt that it was the
most effective single deterrent force in the nation.
The Air Force continued to increase the percentage of missiles procured. In fiscal year 1959 money for procurement of missiles and aircraft
was divided 22 per cent for missiles and 38 per cent for aircraft of the 60 per
cent allotted to these systems. This was an increase in favor of missiles
over fiscal year 1958. It was Mr. Sharp's responsibility to implement
higher decisions though it can be assumed that he contributed to the mak·

..
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ing of them; he was in complete agreement with the balanced force concept for the future. 26
One of the most interesting threads that is woven into Mr. Sharp's
job, and one that was very close tc the problems of industrial planning,
contracting, and procurement, was that of small business. This appears
to have been a major concern of his. Much of the answer for this interest
lies in the fact that Mr. Sharp had been connected with small business
most of his adult life. As a small businessman he had been in competition
with big business. He had an appreciation of what small business could
do. He felt that small business was much more efficient than large business and in certain fields could produce much more economically than
the large concerns because small business was much more flexible and
not as bureaucratic as big business.
Mr. Sharp felt that it was more economical and more justifiable to
spread the wealth as much as possible. This fits very well into the concept of a ready industry, and would help to spread work over a larger
geographical area, and to more efficient organizations. Mr. Sharp cited
the case of a large contractor which was making an item for eight or
nine hundred dollars. The Air Force forced this company to go outside
for this part and the company was able to get it for $125.00. Mr. Sharp
put it this way.
To maintain production in depth in the weapon industry, we are
re-emphasizing and strengthening our make-or-buy procedures.
This, in effect, subjects the primes [prime contractors] to close
screening by the Air Force of work which is performed in plant
versus that work which is placed with outside sources by the
prime contractor. 27

•

However, it must be kept in mind that Mr. Sharp knew perfectly well
that there were some items which small businesses could not make, such
as the B-52. Also, it was these large items that took most of the Air
Force's procurement dollars, as much as 85 per cent. Therefore, it may
appear that small business was not getting a very large share of these
procurement dollars. This is true. But during Mr. Sharp's tour as Assistant Secretary they did get an increased portion of the remainder. Mr.
Sharp was satisfied with the efforts of the Air Force to give small business more of its money and he kept close watch on progress in this direction. 28
In fiscal year 1956, small business had an opportunity to bid on items
worth $1.06 billion and actually received contracts valued at $686 million.
The $1.06 billion represented 12.8 per cent of the total spent on procurement for the year and the $686 million was 8.3 per cent of the total procurement and 65 per cent of the $1.06 billion. In 1957 these figures
climbed to $1.79 billion out of $8.26 billion or 21.6 per cent as compared
to 15 per cent in 1953. During fiscal year 1958 there were more than
2,700 concerns working under Air Force contracts, and 1,751 were classified as small businesses. These small businesses received 17.2 per cent
of the prime contracts to the sum of $757 million and at the same time
prime contractors subcontracted 20 per cent of their Air Force business
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to small business. The total amount received by small concerns in fiscal
)'ear 1958 was $2.5 billion. 29
One of Mr. Sharp's primary responsibilities was that of civilian aviation. It was his job as Assistant Secretary to ascertain that in the event
of war there was an efficient and adequate civilian reserve fleet to augment
the Military Air Transport Service (MATS) operated by the Air Force.
In January, February, and March of 1958 MATS came under fire from
Congress. Hearings were held on MATS and as its came under Mr.
Sharp's jurisdiction, he was the Department of Defense's chief witness,
and had to conduct and coordinate that Department's testimony. The basic
questions were whether or not MATS was too large and whether or not
more of MATS business should be turned over to the civil airlines. 30
At the outset of the hearings, Mr. Sharp made it very clear "that a
strong, well-trained and fully responsive military airlift force is an absolutely essential element of our defense posture." He felt that this had
to be a force in being, "which when augmented by civil air transport resources, are qualitatively and quantitatively capable of providing the airlift support required for successful implementation of war plans approved
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff."31 The plan was for MATS to provide airlift for the initial 48 hours of an emergency with the Civil Reserve Air
Fleet (CRAF) providing assistance after this time. This 48 hour period
would give CRAF an opportunity to become fully organized and assembled.
In fiscal year 1958 CRAF consisted of 362 4-engine aircraft. Becau;;e of
the 48 hours delay before CRAF would become effective, Mr. Sharp
thought that to reduce MATS would weaken national defenses. On the
contrary he thought it would be more "reasonable to assert that MATS
peacetime operations must continue at the present rate, or go higher."32
It is natural that the longer Mr. Sharp remained in Washington with
the Air Force that his pride in this service should increase. He likened
the Air Force to a business concern, the biggest in the Unite States, but
with a less tangible product. This was "the assurance that one can continue to live in and enjoy the privileges of this great nation."33 In other
words, security. The Air Force touched almost every aspect of American
life with its bases, research facilities, and dealings with industry. In addition, much contact with foreign nations was maintained through overseas bases.

Though Mr. Sharp was proud of the job the Air Force was doing, he
was equally aware that there were shortcomings in its operation. He recognized that the Air Force was not without criticism, and that it was always seeking constructive criticism. For this reason he felt that Congressional hearings were helpful because they might uncover weaknesses
of the Air Force. But at the same time he felt that progress was being
made toward better management of the Air Force.
We have isolated the areas that
Control in the other areas has been
level at which effective action can be
essence of good management. With
committee, and the others interested

require top level attention.
decentralized to the lowest
provided. This to me is the
the able assistance of your
in the progress of the Air

..
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Force, the situation will continue to improve. The professional
management of the Air Force, both civilian and military, is without any question one of the finest, most dedicated groups I have
ever been privileged to work with. If you will bear with them
should they make minor mistakes because of the fearful complexity of their task, I think you can rest assured that they will produce an effective force to defend our land at a reasonable cost
to our people. 34
This statement sums up Mr. Shat'p's opinion of the Air Force and of the
job this service was doing for the country.
On January 28, 1959 the !liew York Times carried the announcement
that Mr. Sharp has resigned as Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Materiel. This had been hinted at as early as October 28, 1958. His resignation was to be effective on January 31, 1959. His successor was reported to be Philip B. Taylor of Upper Montclair, New Jersey. Mr. Sharp
gave his reasons for resigning as home, friends, and business. He stated,
"My job with the Air Force has been very rewarding. But it has also been
very wearing and confining. I came to Washington with the idea that it
would only be for two years. I think it is time I gave someone else a
chance to enjoy the pleasures of a very fine job."
President Eisenhower paid him this tribute in a letter:
The attention you have given to the civil aviation industry and
small business and your many other contributions in the procurement field should be a source of great satisfaction to you as well
as they are to me. Providing an adequate military airlift is an
item of utmost importance to our national security. Your contribution toward achieving this goal is noteworthy.35

.-

Mr. Sharp was not destined to remain long in Houston among his
friends and with his business. On Jun.e 30, 1959, only five months after
his resignation, it was reported that Mr. Sharp would succeed Malcolm A.
MacIntyre as Under Secretary of the Air Force. A formal announcement
was expected in a few days. On July 9 the formal announcement came.
Mr. MacIntyre was resigning effective July 31, and the President had
nominated Mr. Sharp to replace him.
The primary reason for Mr. Sharp's return to government service was
because Mr. MacIntyre had resigned on short notice and there was not
enough time to cast around for an experienced replacement. As Mr. Sharp
was experienced in the Department of the Air Force, Mr. James Douglas,
Secretary of the Air Force, prevailed upon him to take the position of
Under Secretary. Mr. Sharp had no apparent qualms about returning to
Washington, but rather felt it was his duty to do so.
Mr. Sharp hardly had time to get acquainted with his new duties when
another shift occurred. Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald A. Quarles
died suddenly in November 1959. Also a change in Defense Secretaries
took place with Thomas S. Gates succeeding Neil H. McElroy. The most
likely candidate for the Deputy Secretary position was Mr. Douglas. If
this came about then Mr. Sharp would be the logical choice for Secretary
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of the Air Force. On December 10, 1959 it was announced that Mr. Douglas would be Deputy Secretary of Defense and Mr. Sharp would be Secretary of the Air Force. He was sworn in the next day.36
The tasks confronting Mr. Sharp as Secretary of the Air Force were
to be more encompassing and much more Air Force wide than those he
had as Assistant Secretary. He was to deal more with overall policy, and
general Air Force programs and concepts than before. But this is not to
assume that the problems and tasks that he had been concerned with previously were forgotten. Many of the same threads that had been broken
by his short absence were picked up again. In addition, by virtue of his
position of increased importance, additional tasks were performed. It
would be best to pick up and complete the threads that ran through the
years that he was Assistant Secretary before going into other aspects of
his job as Secretary.
The Ail' Force continued to reduce the number of machine tools in its
possession. By June 1960 there were 77,000 valued at $928 million compared to 88,900 valued at $1.09 billion a year before. It is significant that
the number in use remained virtually steady at 65,000. This reduction
was part of the effort to reduce "spiraling costs due to technological
changes and frequent changes in requirements."37
As indicated previously, Mr. Sharp was never completely satisfied with
contracting procedures even though he had made efforts to get more incentive clauses into contracts. The dollar value of contracts let during
the period when Mr. Sharp was Secretary remained fairly stable; $9.65
billion in fiscal year 1960 as compared to the nine year average of $9.42
billion. More emphasis was being placed on missiles than before. A good
example of Mr. Sharp's dissatisfaction with contracting is the controversial
SKYBOLT missile. The program was started on a hush-hush basis. The
Martin Company received approximately $7 million to fire 13 missiles in
a 12 month period to test the missile's feasibility. No guidance system
was to be included in the original tests. Martin fired 11 missiles well
within the allotted time and felt that no further firings were required
as they had learned all that was necessary. However, Martin decided to
go ahead and fire the last two SKYBOLTs at satellites to see how close
they could come. They apparently came very close. When Martin had
completed their tests they turned back $2 million to the Air Force. Now
in accordance with the system of source selection for final production, the
prime contract was let to the concern with the largest engineering department; Douglas Aircraft. Mr. Sharp expressed concern that the contract had not been let to the company that had proved it had the team to
do the job.38
As it turned out, Douglas was spending about $10 million a month on
SKYBOLT with an engineering department of 3500 (100 at Martin) and
they were not producing any missiles. Mr. Sharp felt this was wrong
because SKYBOLT was being lost because it got out of hand. He felt
that the missile was of importance because it would prolong the useful
life of bombers on hand; the B-52, and the British V-bombers. 39
Mr. Sharp was not sure what the solution should be, but he proposed
a possible solution:

,.
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You might have two or three contractors carryon the development of the project, in its early stages, to some point in the development and then decide which one had done the best job, and
the cheapest job, and looked like he was the best contractor. Then
pick him to carryon the final development and the production.
You'd really have some competition in the system. Now our competition is paper competition. 40

.:

In the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Air Force for fiscal year
1960 (July 1, i959 to June 30, 1960) Mr. Sharp stated that plans instituted five years previously were bearing fruit in actual weapon systems,
"bringing us considerably closer to our military goal of maximum security
against nuclear missile aggression."41 The ATLAS missile had been declared operational, TITAN was well into the development stage and would
be operational in 1961, and the MINUTEMAN was one year ahead of
schedule and would become operational in 1963. The Air Force was striving to do three things: (1) to maintain a combat force that could withstand an attack and mount a retaliatory force capable of destroying any
aggressor; (2) to do everything possible to develop weapons; and (3) to
help in any other way to contribute to the defense of the free world. However, Mr. Sharp was quick to point out that though the Air Force was
strong it had by no means attained full strength. There was always room
for improvement and the biggest problem was to determine what future
weapons were to be invested in. Money was the most important factor in
this determination, and Mr. Sharp felt that success in putting the money
available in the right places would determine the effectiveness of the Air
Force in the future. Mr. Sharp had stressed before that quality not quantity was the important thing in the Air Force. This test of quality applied to personnel as well. Constant reductions in the strength of Air
Force personnel were taking place: 840,435 to 814,752 between July 1, 1959
and June 30, 1860. Therefore, with a decreasing manpower force Mr.
Sharp felt that the quality of this manpower had to improve and was being
improved. It is interesting to note that Mr. Sharp felt there were still
too many people in the Air Force. The size of the Air Force in 1960 was
the same as in 1952. There were 96 wings; 93 manned and 3 missile. But
the quality had improved. 42
During appropriation hearings in 1960, Mr. Sharp stressed the point
that the $17,737,000,000 requested for the Air Force for the coming year,
though a large amount, did not provide for everything that possibly was
needed by the Air Force. On the other hand he felt a strong balance had
been provided in the Air Force programs. Again he stressed the fact
that change was evident in the Air Force. Missiles were playing a more
important role in the inventory and would become more important in the
future. Mr. Sharp could not foresee the time when the manned aircraft
would not be necessary. He concluded his statement at the hearings with
a statement that clearly indicates his idea of the structure of the Air
Force in the future.
In conclusion, I believe I can characterize this budget as one
which provides for reasonable progress in the continuing transition from a manned aircraft force to a mixed manned and missile
force; permits a reasonable degree of modernization of the
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manned aircraft portion of that force; affords an acceptable
level of research and development toward the weapon and support systems of the future; and provides for maintenance, operation, and training of today's force in being at a minimum acceptable leve1. 43

An increased percentage of Air Force business was going to small
business even though the dollar value decreased. In fiscal year 1960 small
business received $864 million as compared to $920 million in fiscal year
1959. However, the percentage increased from 8.5 to 9%. The reduction
was caused by a total reduction in procurement of $1.2 billion. The percentage of Air Force business going to small concerns was well above the
nine year average of 7.5 per cent.H
As Secretary of the Air Force Mr. Sharp became involved in matters
dealing with more policy and with problems that would have a great deal
to do with the future structure of the Air Force. One of these was the
B-70 program. During fiscal year 1961 the Air Force was faced with the
problem of deciding whether or not to put $456 million into developing the
B-70. A choice had to be made between the B-70, an offensive weapon, and
the F-108, a defensive weapon. This was necessitated by the budget. Both
weapons could not be included in the Air Force budget. There was disagreement within the Air Force itself on which program should be continued. The Weapons Board wanted both, but preferred the F-108. The
Air Force Policy Council wanted both also, but preferred the B-70. This
left the final decision up to Mr. Sharp and General Thomas D. White,
Chief of Staff of the Air Force. General White lost a lot of sleep in deciding on the B-70. Mr. Sharp was not as convinced as the Chief of Staff
in the beginning. However, he came to look upon the B-70 as the right
choice. "I finally came al·ound to the conclusion, that in the first place,
That we needed our atomic deterrents more than we needed the defensive
capabilities of the F-108."45
Also he felt that one more generation of manned bombers was necessary because he did not feel that missiles had been developed far enough to
be relied upon as the only deterrent weapon. In addition, just by going
ahead with the B-70 would pose a problem to the enemy and would possibly force him to spend valuable time and money devising and constructing a defense. This, Mr. Sharp thought, would take effort away from
some other project that might prove more harmful to the United States
than building a defense against the B-70. He felt in 1963 that the B-70
should be continued, but he frankly admitted he was not sure at what
level of annual expense. He was not able to determine this while he was
Secretary of the Air Force. 46
The whole issue was brought to light because the Air Force was asking
for less than previously for the B-70. Congressman Carl Vinson strongly
supported this program and he thought that by reducing funds for the
B-70 it would "increase the threat to our own survival." General White
stated that the decision to cut funds had not been made by the Air Force.
This indicates that the decision had been made at a higher level. In October 1960 the Air Force received an additional $100 million for the B-70
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from Congress and a target date for an operational squadron was set
for 1966.47
Most of us remember the furor over the so-called missile gap. Mr.
Sharp became actively involved in this controversy. His part began when
he and General White, at a brIefing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 26, 1960, "sought to allay fears of the 'missile gap' by
stressing the 'prime threat' of Soviet bombers now."48 They felt that due
to the attention being paid to the increasing Soviet missile threat that the
Russian aircraft strength was being overlooked. They were not attempting
to say that there was not a missile threat, but rather a mixed missile and
bomber threat. Based on 1959 intelligence estimates the Soviets were outproducing the United States three to one in missiles. This was the missile gap.
No one disagreed with the fact that there was a gap in missiles number
for number. But what Mr. Sharp wanted to make clear was that there
was no "deterrent gap." There is a difference. Missiles mean, simply,
missiles. Deterrent means all of the offensive weapons in the arsenal;
SAC bombers, carrier based bombers, and missiles. He said at the time
that the Air Force was getting as many missiles as it needed for a well
balanced program, and added that intelligence estimates had indicated
that the Russians were not making missiles as fast as previously thought.
However, he felt that the United States should push ahead in its missile
production, and stated that increased success was being had with the
ATLAS. The President had given the missile program first priority.49
In 1963 Mr. Sharp maintained that this gap never existed in terms of
overall deterrence. He felt that no one really knew how many missiles the
Soviets were producing. Even if the number was large the Soviets would
have had to make a great many to destroy the United States retaliatory
capability, and he felt that they did not have the strength to do it at that
time; neither do they have it now. 50
All of this harks back to Mr. Sharp's basic idea of a balanced deterrent
force. He was not at all receptive to the idea of putting all of the emphasis on missiles to the detriment of manned bombers. This was the
reason why Mr. Sharp wanted the B-70 program to continue. He was
worried by the thought that if the United States invested entirely in missiles, and the Russians developed an anti-missile missile, the American
deterrent force would be impotent. He stated that missiles fly a predetermined track to targets, whereas a bomber does not have to do this. In
addition they can go in at low levels thereby avoiding many defenses.
Maintaining a balanced deterrent force was to Mr. Sharp the best policy
for the United States to follow at present, and he did not believe that
the Soviet strategic capability would equal that of the United States at any
time in the future. 51
Closely connected with the problem of the structure of the United
States deterrent force was the proposal by General Thomas Powers, Commander of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), for a full time airborne
alert of SAC in February 1960. The proposal was to keep a substantial
number of SAC bombers in the air 24 hours a day as a precaution against
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surprise attack. What part of SAC this was to consist of or consists of
today is not known as this is classified information. Mr. Sharp agreed
with General Powers's proposal in principle. The difference was that
the Commander of SAC wanted planes in the air while Mr. Sharp wanted
to prepare for an airborne alert should the necessity arise. Mr. Sharp
wanted to set aside a reserve of spare parts in case a full-blown airborne
alert should become necessary. This was already in progress-the setting
aside of spare parts. Also an airborne alert would require additional personnel and plans had been initiated to provide these. But all of this would
cost more money. Mr. Sharp said that the only way to avoid increased
spending was to reduce the size of the Air Force but retain quality, and
he wanted to make it clear that any additional stockpiling of spare parts
would be expensive. While he was willing to prepare for an airborne alert
he did not want to implement it until it became an absolute necessity because of the expense. He would rather spend budget dollars on other
projects at the time. Further he felt the time would pass when an airborne alert would be necessary because of the increased number of missiles that would be introduced into the United States retaliatory force.
Also just the threat of an airborne alert without announcing the size of
it "is in itself a pretty good-sized deterrent."52 The first Ballistic Missile
Early Warning System was due to become operational in September 1960.
and Mr. Sharp stated that this would alleviate to some degree the problem
of having SAC destroyed on the ground by better early warning. This
would decrease the necessity of an airborne alert. 53

1
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As missiles began to assume a more important role in the Air Force
inventory it became important to get them located in sites. In late 1959
or early 1960 the idea of putting the MINUTEMAN on mobile trains had
been advanced. This appealed to Mr. Sharp. He felt that mobility would
make the missiles much more difficult to find and hit as they would be
constantly moving. A mobile MINUTEMAN, a mobile POLARIS, and
the airborne alert would prove difficult targets and in case of surprise
attack it would be possible to have a larger retaliatory force. However,
he had this additional thought. If the United States made its deterrent
force too difficult to find and hit the enemy might decide to put all of his
missiles on our population centers. Mr. Sharp felt that the POLARIS was
an expensive way to get mobility, but had the advantage of getting such
strategic targets out of the country. Again the Russians might be willing
to sustain the POLARIS, as they were almost impossible targets, to reach
targets in the United States. 54 There were some MINUTEMAN trains
planned and even tested but they were dropped in 1962 in favor of hard
sites.
Probably one of the most disagreeable controversies that Mr. Sharp
got involved in was that in February 1960 over one of the Air Force's
training manuals. This was Air Reserve Center Training Manual, Student Text, NR 45-0050, Vol. 7. In this manual certain religious organizations were said to have been infiltrated by Communists. As a result the
National Council of Churches protested. Congress held hearings, the
manual was withdrawn, and Mr. Sharp himself had an investigation
started. He further initiated safeguards against any recurrence of the
episode. Mr. Sharp held to this position: "I feel that this sort of accusa-
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tion was not necessary, from an Air Force standpoint, to warn its people
that they must look in all organizations for Communist infiltration. I
think that the Air Force should not enter into the controversy as to
whether or not a particular organization or group is infiltrated by Communism." He later termed the episode as "perfectly ridiculous."55
As Secretary of the Air Force Mr. Sharp was called upon to make more
speeches and public appearances than he was as an Assistant Secretary.
Covering one such trip will suffice as an example. On June 8, 1960 he made
the graduation address at the United States Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs, Colorado. In his address Mr. Sharp summed up his basic
idea on the force structure of the Air Force:
Weare changing our force structure, our procurement, our
priorities and our personnel skills to accommodate an ever-increasing number of missile units. We are establishing vast new miE'sile
bases and closing manned bases.
While we do not known the optimum ration between missiles and
manned aircraft in our forces of the future, each system has its
advantages and each can perform essential functions that others
cannot. Thus, we are certain that we will have both type weapons
in our inventory as far into the future as we can see.56
He admonished the Class of 1960 never to "allow the narrow view of
apparent service interest to blind you to your basic duty-to cooperate with
the other services and all departments of Government, to the end that we
will have in this nation an adequate total defense force to achieve our
national goals."
In January 1961 with the coming of the Kennedy administration Mr.
Sharp left the post of Secretary of the Air Force. He was replaced by
Mr. Eugene Zukert who had been an Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
from 1947 to 1952, and, incidentally, was also a Naval officer during
World War II.57
CONCLUSION

Mr. Sharp went to Washington to serve. For four and one-half years
he worked exclusively for the United States government. During this
time he sacrificed his business and· his financial interests to perform a
duty for his country. He gave of his time, energy, and experience. Though
he did not always have success in his endeavors, he did contribute.

.

When speaking of the programs and progress of the Air Force, he almost always used the plural "we," not the singular "I." He did not try to
answer questions to which he did not know the answers, but deferred them
to more qualified persons. These qualified persons were generally military
officers who were specialists in a particular field. In Congressional hearings Mr. Sharp never allowed one of his Air Force officers to be harassed,
but would step in himself and defend a position or take the blame.
The words of other men do not always convey a true picture of how
well a man has performed. But men who have worked with individuals
or have seen them in action are able to form fairly accurate judgments of
their ability and performance.
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General Orval R. Cook, USAF (Retired), President of the Aircraft
Industries Association, 1957-1961, said:
Mr. Sharp is a very conscientious man. He believes that he
owes a duty of service to his country, and he has tried to render
service to the best of his ability. He has a high sense of integrity-higher, in my opinion, than others I have known in the
positions he occupied. I found him very cooperative; not easily
ruffled; and much better informed on many subjects than he was
generally given credit for. He was a good listener, and did not
do much to let the person he was listening to know how much he
(Sharp) knew about the subject being discussed. He is articulate,
but his ability in this respect is about average. He gives a first
impression of being serious-minded, and is, to a degree. I have
found that he has an excellent sense of humor, however, and enjoys a humorous situation or circumstance as well as most of the
extroverts.58
Senator Stuart Symington stated that "Secretary Sharp was known to
be a man of integrity and ability-and made a fine record in the high pos:itions he held in the Executive Branch of the Government."59
Representative Carl Vinson has made it a matter of policy not to give
appraisals of past or present government officials. Mr. Vinson does say
that "any comments I might make as to Mr. Sharp's performance of duty
would, I assure you, be complimentary."6o What starts out to be no comment is, in fact, very complimentary to Mr. Sharp.
Senator Richard B. Russell stated, "In his appearances before the
Committee [Armed Services], Mr. Sharp impressed me as being well informed and as having the ability to articulate his views clearly. I think
the performance of his duties reflects credit upon him personally and resulted in progress by the Air Force."61
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